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ABSTRACT: This paper responds to a recent challenge for the validity of extrapolation of neurobiological knowledge 
from laboratory animals to humans. According to this challenge, experimental neurobiology, and thus neuro-
science, is in a state of crisis because the knowledge produced in different laboratories hardly generalizes from 
one laboratory to another. Presumably, this is so because neurobiological laboratories use simplified animal 
models of human conditions that differ across laboratories. By contrast, I argue that maintaining a multiplicity 
of experimental protocols and simple models is well justified. It fosters rather than precludes the validity of ex-
trapolation of neurobiological knowledge. The discipline is thriving.
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RESUMEN: Este artículo responde a un reto reciente: la validez de extrapolar  el conocimiento neurobiológico del labo-
ratorio animal a los humanos. Según esta objeción la neurobiología experimental, y por ende la neurociencia, 
está en crisis porque el conocimiento obtenido en los laboratorios de neurobiología utiliza modelos animales 
simplificados de las condiciones humanas que difieren de unos laboratorios a otros. Por el contrario, sostengo 
que mantener una diversidad de protocolos experimentales y de modelos simples está sobradamente justificado. 
Favorece, en vez de impedir, la validez de la extrapolación de conocimiento neurobiológico. La neurobiología es 
una disciplina floreciente. 
Palabras clave: modelos animales, calibración, validez, fiabilidad, neurobiología experimental.
1. Introduction
Experimentation in neurobiology is a special kind of biomedical experimentation. As such, 
it faces the challenges commonly raised against the experimental practice of using animals 
for biomedical models of human conditions. Among these is the challenge for the validity 
of extrapolation of laboratory knowledge to phenomena that occur naturally in the world 
outside the laboratory. Variations of this challenge have been raised on various occasions 
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for the validity of knowledge claims about the biological world produced in biological and 
biomedical laboratories (e.g. Diamond 1986, LaFollette and Shanks 1995, and Shanks et 
al. 2009). Essentially, the challenge consists in pointing out that the peculiarities and com-
plexities of natural phenomena cannot be reproduced in the artificial context of the labora-
tory, especially when the knowledge claims are intended to generalize from laboratory ani-
mals to humans in the natural world. Thus, whatever knowledge can be produced on the 
basis of laboratory experimentation, it simply cannot capture the phenomena that occur in 
the natural world. Responses to these challenges include Skipper (2004), Steel (2008), and 
Degeling and Johnson (2013).
A version of the challenge was recently articulated for the case of neurobiological ex-
perimentation. Sullivan (2007, 2009, 2010) argues that contemporary experimental neu-
robiology is in a state of crisis. In her account, this is the result of the experimenters’ strong 
commitment to strengthening the reproducibility, or reliability, of the experimental effects 
they study at the expense of the generalizability, or validity, of the knowledge claims pro-
duced in the laboratory. Sullivan cautions that the experimental practices of contemporary 
neurobiology may lead to the production of knowledge which is valid only in the local con-
text of the laboratory in which it is produced. In her account, this is feasible because the 
laboratory contexts in which experimental animals are raised and tested are too controlled 
in order to ensure reliability of experimental procedures. Thus, they are too simplified and 
do not nearly match the complexity of the contexts in which the targeted phenomena oc-
cur naturally. In Sullivan’s account thus, simplicity is prerequisite for reliability and com-
plexity is prerequisite for validity. That is to say, the two norms of experimental design are 
in an inherent conflict with one another. Moreover, different laboratories use multiple dif-
ferent experimental protocols. This, according to Sullivan, prevents applying the knowl-
edge produced in one laboratory to the effects studied in another. The lack of generaliz-
ability of knowledge across laboratories as well as knowledge produced in the laboratory to 
phenomena in the world outside the laboratory defines the state of crisis which Sullivan at-
tributes to contemporary experimental neurobiology.
In other words, neurobiology is in a state of crisis because the knowledge it produces 
cannot be extrapolated to the phenomena it aims to study. This further precludes the in-
tegration of knowledge in neuroscience given that neurobiology is an integral part of neu-
roscience. This result is unsettling for both neuroscience and philosophy of neuroscience, 
especially given that Sullivan’s analysis was the only systematic account of experimenta-
tion in neuroscience until Silva, Landreth, and Bickle (2014) recently came out of press. It 
explicitly challenges leading philosophical accounts of neuroscience such as Bickle (2006), 
Craver (2007), and Bechtel (2008) among others. Thus, it is important for philosophy of 
neuroscience to address the challenge for extrapolation of experimental knowledge in neu-
robiology raised by Sullivan.
For this reason, my purpose here is to provide an alternative account of experimenta-
tion in neurobiology such that it will make sense of the contemporary experimental prac-
tices and methodological decisions in the field. I will argue that maintaining a multiplic-
ity of different experimental protocols and strengthening the reliability of multiple simple 
protocols are well justified and, contrary to Sullivan’s analysis, the presence of both indi-
cates thriving rather than crisis of experimental neurobiology.
In order to achieve my goal, I will reconceptualize the notion of validity in order 
to show that, contrary to Sullivan’s account, maintaining a multiplicity of different ex-
Theoria 30/2 (2015): 163-181
 Validating Animal Models 165
perimental designs and protocols does not prevent neurobiology from producing valid 
knowledge claims as well as that strengthening reliability of experimental designs does 
not prevent the production of valid knowledge claims. I will do that by studying the ex-
plicit methodological discussions in which practicing neurobiologists engage and will 
analyze the practices they employ when establishing the validity of their experimental 
results. On this basis, I will show that neurobiologists use an elaborate calibration strat-
egy that allows them to compare the validity of multiple simple experimental designs 
and this is the same strategy they use when they establish the reliability of their experi-
mental designs. Thus, the purported tension between validity and reliability dissolves. 
Moreover, the strategy relies on the use and comparison of multiple experimental de-
signs and protocols. This ultimately means that the multiplicity of experimental proto-
cols and the stress on their reliability in neurobiology indicate thriving rather than a cri-
sis of the discipline.
I will proceed as follows. First, I will reconstruct Sullivan’s analysis of the state of con-
temporary experimental neurobiology. Next, I will show that the notion of validity she op-
erates on does not adequately capture the notions of validity which are commonly in play 
in neurobiology. Moreover, Sullivan focuses on the validity of knowledge claims and largely 
ignores the practices of validating the models used in neurobiological experiments to gen-
erate those knowledge claims. Because those models are almost exclusively animal mod-
els, I articulate an account of animal models as experimental tools in neurobiology. A ma-
jor step in validating the results of experiments that use animal models is to first show that 
the models are valid as representations of the human conditions under study. Then, I show 
that this validation proceeds on the basis of calibration strategy similar to the calibration 
used in physics (Franklin 1997) and evolutionary biology (Skipper 2004). Next, I show 
that the same calibration strategy is used in establishing the reliability of animal models as 
experimental tools. This allows me to conclude that considerations for both reliability and 
validity imply the use of multiple simple experimental designs and protocols. The prescrip-
tions of reliability thus do not go against the prescriptions of validity. Moreover, using mul-
tiple experimental designs and protocols is in fact prerequisite for both validity and reli-
ability. This ultimately shows that what Sullivan takes to indicate a crisis in experimental 
neurobiology is in fact beneficial for the field.
2. The Crisis of Experimental Neurobiology
Sullivan’s analysis of the practice of experimental neurobiology makes explicit two funda-
mental norms of experimental design that, in her view, are in tension with one another: 
reliability and validity. In her account, reliability is a feature of the data production proc-
ess which is associated with the repeatability and reproducibility of experimental effects 
and data. Sullivan takes this process to include experimental design and its implementation 
across multiple experimental trials in a given laboratory (Sullivan 2007, 7; 2009, 533). The 
value “reliable” is ascribed to a complete data production process when “it results in statisti-
cally analyzed data that can be used to discriminate one hypothesis from a set of competing 
hypotheses about an effect produced in the laboratory” (2007, 17; 2009, 534). In Sullivan’s 
account, reliability is associated with repeatability because repetition of an experiment pro-
vides insights on potential errors as well as “some degree of certainty that an effect pro-
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duced in the laboratory is not an artifact but rather the direct result of a relevant experi-
mental manipulation” (2007, 7). Sullivan points out that experimental design begins with 
a process of modification of the phenomenon of interest so that it can be “translated” into 
an effect that can be reproduced in the laboratory. This process involves the elimination of 
“factors that impede the discovery of the variables that contribute to its production” (2007, 
67). She notes that, “If an investigator wants to describe some feature of the effect of inter-
est or to isolate what causes it, she necessarily has to direct the question at an effect that can 
be accompanied feasibly by a definitive set of competing hypotheses or claims about the ef-
fect and what produces it” (id.).
This process of translation, thus, involves simplification of the original phenomenon 
so it can be reproduced reliably in the laboratory. Simplification allows for better control of 
the causal variables that could have impact on the studied effect. It also enables specifying a 
definitive set of causal hypotheses that could account for the studied effect. Thus, reliabil-
ity prescribes simplicity of experimental designs.
In addition to reliability, validity is another important constraint on the experimental 
process in neurobiology. In Sullivan’s account, validity is a feature of interpretative claims 
produced on the basis of experimental results. It is the value ascribed to knowledge claims 
that can legitimately be applied to phenomena occurring in contexts different than the 
contexts in which they were originally produced. According to her, valid knowledge claims 
should be (1) the product of a reliable experimental process and (2) arrived at in laboratory 
contexts that are relevantly similar to the natural world contexts in which the phenomena 
of interest occur (2007, 88; 2009, 535). Reliability is thus necessary for validity but because 
of the second condition, in Sullivan’s account, validity has to be considered separately from 
reliability. Further, because the natural contexts in which the studied phenomena occur are 
far more complex than the controlled environments in which laboratory animals are raised 
and tested, increasing the similarity between the two depends on making the laboratory 
contexts more complex in order to match the complexity of the natural environments they 
are meant to recreate. Thus, validity prescribes complexity of experimental designs.
In Sullivan’s analysis, reliability and validity turn out to give opposing prescriptions for 
experimental design. On the one hand, reliability prescribes simplifying experimental de-
signs in order to make it easier to detect and measure the studied effect. This would secure 
local, within laboratory, replication and tractability of effects. Validity, on the other hand, 
prescribes increasing the complexity of experimental designs in order to secure the appro-
priate degree of similarity between the laboratory and the natural environments of the 
tested subjects. Thus, she concludes that there is an inherent tradeoff between reliability 
and validity as constraints on experimental design. The more reliable a given experiment, 
the less valid the knowledge claims produced on its basis would be and vice versa. Because 
validity requires data produced through a reliable process it can never be increased to an ex-
tent as to lose reliability without losing validity as well. However, in Sullivan’s account, re-
liability can be increased to an extent to which all validity can be lost (2007, 138-9; 2009, 
535). Such would be the case with experiments that are so precise and controlled that they 
would not generate knowledge that could be extended to any context other than the one in 
which it was produced, including the natural world as well as the contexts of other labora-
tories that aim to study the same effects in different environments.
Furthermore, Sullivan reaches the conclusion that contemporary experimental neuro-
biology is —to put it mildly— very close to being in the situation where individual labora-
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tories produce locally reliable knowledge which does not extend either to knowledge about 
phenomena in the world or to effects produced and studied in other laboratories. This state 
amounts to a crisis in the field of experimental neurobiology. In Sullivan’s words,
…neurobiologists often make global claims about the cellular and molecular mechanisms of 
learning and memory. Yet, in most if not all cases of experimentation in this area, these interpre-
tative claims are at best only internally valid claims – i.e., not extendable beyond the context of 
that laboratory that gave rise to them. This is because experimentalists in cellular and molecular 
neurobiology are more concerned with securing the reliability of their experiments than ensuring 
their validity. This makes sense, given the complexity of the brain and the complexity of learning 
phenomena. It is also rational, given that reliability is requisite for validity. And yet, the global ex-
planatory aims of neurobiology, namely, to understand the cellular and molecular mechanisms of 
learning and memory across organisms, are not being realized. I take this to be the explanatory cri-
sis in neurobiology (2007, 142).
Sullivan (2007) proposes a solution to the problem for the generalizability of locally valid 
laboratory knowledge to phenomena in the natural world. She advocates a strategy for in-
creasing the validity of neurobiological knowledge which involves designing experiments in 
such a way as to gradually increase the validity of the knowledge they inspire. Her assump-
tion is that this increase of validity can be achieved by making experimental environments 
and their features resemble more closely the natural environments of the phenomena they 
target to capture. The main strategy is to gradually increase the complexity of the experi-
mental environments and stimuli so as to make them more similar to complex natural-
world environments and stimuli which the tested organisms would encounter outside the 
laboratory. This can take the form of designing “incremental experiments”. They would 
proceed by adding features (parameters) to a given experimental environment and/or stim-
uli so that the whole system gets to resemble more closely the targeted natural phenome-
non and its environment and/or the stimuli which trigger the studied effect.
Sullivan proposes two variations on this strategy: (1) designing a series of experiments 
with variation of a given parameter and integration of the results of the entire series and 
(2) designing a series of experiments with additive variation of parameters. In the first case, 
the data produced in one experimental setup are compared to the data produced via a setup 
that differs with respect to a given feature from the first setup. The series may involve ex-
periments that include multiple variations of a given feature. The results of the whole series 
are integrated and the conclusions reached this way have a broader scope than each individ-
ual experiment’s results. This procedure preserves reliability but it also increases the simi-
larity of the integrated model of the experimental system to the targeted system and thus 
increases validity as well. The second variation of the solution Sullivan proposes involves 
gradual adding of new features to a sequence of experiments in order to increase the valid-
ity of the claims about the experimental results by making the whole system more similar to 
the targeted natural system (2007, 160-65).
The problem with this solution is that it suggests some sort of standardization and 
unification of experimental procedures and designs across experiments and laboratories. 
It presumes that different laboratories will have to adopt unified basic procedures in order 
to secure the variation only of that single parameter that is supposed to be added to the ba-
sic system which was used in a prior experiment in a different laboratory. However, neuro-
biologists value the variety of modifications on the same basic experimental setups and pro-
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cedures (Wahlsten 2001) and they have good reasons for that as well. As Würbel (2000) 
points out, the reproducibility of effects that can be achieved through standardization goes 
against the capability of experiments to produce new knowledge. It may also lead to the re-
producibility of artifacts and errors. That is why Würbel concludes that “systematic varia-
tion of situations should form an integral part of all animal experimentation” (2000, 263).
3. Towards an Alternative Solution
Because of the unsettling implications of Sullivan’s solution, I set out to articulate an alter-
native account of the practice of experimental neurobiology which is to make sense of the 
methodological decisions made in the field, in particular the decisions to maintain a multi-
plicity of experimental designs and protocols and to prefer simple reliable designs. My goal 
is to show that these decisions do not prevent the production of valid knowledge which ex-
tends to knowledge about effects produced in different laboratories and ultimately to phe-
nomena that occur naturally in the world outside the laboratory.
This requires reevaluation of Sullivan’s account of the tradeoff between reliability and 
validity. In her analysis, the two are opposed because reliability prescribes simplifying ex-
perimental protocols and procedures, which guarantees reproducibility of laboratory ef-
fects, while validity prescribes making experimental designs more complex in order to se-
cure greater resemblance between laboratory models and their targeted natural phenomena. 
This means that in order to reconcile the two opposing prescriptions the association of reli-
ability with simplicity, on the one hand, and/or the association of validity with complexity, 
on the other, have to be reconsidered. The association of reliability with simplicity is fairly 
unproblematic. It is, after all, easier to reproduce the effects of a smaller number of contrib-
uting variables. This leaves me with the option to reconceptualize validity in a way that will 
disassociate it from complexity.
The disassociation of validity from complexity requires reevaluation of Sullivan’s anal-
ysis of the validity estimations required in experimental neurobiology. Her view is that neu-
robiological knowledge claims are valid, that is legitimately generalizable, when they are 
produced in environments that are sufficiently similar to the environments characteristic 
of the tested organisms in the natural world. Thus, when neurobiologists study learning 
and memory using laboratory rats, according to Sullivan, they have to make the laboratory 
environments in which they raise and test them sufficiently similar to the environments in-
habited by wild rats. Because the environments inhabited by wild rats are way more com-
plex than the typical laboratory environment, the laboratory environments have to become 
more complex.
Sullivan’s assumption that this would ground the extension of laboratory knowledge 
produced via animal experimentation to humans in the natural world is highly problem-
atic. She admits that most of experimental neurobiology targets cognitive processes that 
occur naturally in humans not in wild animals. Nevertheless, she stipulates that making 
laboratory rats resemble their natural-world counterparts will make them more similar to 
humans and thus will ensure the validity of extrapolation of laboratory knowledge pro-
duced in animal studies to humans (Sullivan 2007, 153-4). Her strategy to increase the req-
uisite similarity would be adequate in studies that aim to extrapolate laboratory knowledge 
produced in one species to members of the same species outside of the laboratory. In other 
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words, Sullivan’s analysis of validity would be adequate for cognitive ethology (e.g. when 
knowledge about learning in laboratory rats is generalized to knowledge about rat learning 
in general) or for psychological experiments on human subjects which aim to extrapolate 
knowledge about humans in the laboratory to humans in the natural world.
This problematic assumption made by Sullivan is perhaps due to her focusing almost 
exclusively on notions of validity and reliability employed in psychology. However, spell-
ing out an adequate account of neurobiological animal experimentation would be better 
grounded if it incorporated considerations of the reliability and validity criteria employed 
in neurobiological experimentation broadly construed, including neurobiology of cogni-
tion and emotions as well as medical neurobiology of cognitive, psychiatric, neurological, 
and mood disorders. Studying the discussions of modeling in biology, especially the discus-
sions about the epistemological features of model organisms and animal models, which are 
basic tools of experimental biology, would provide important insights into the nature of ex-
perimentation in neurobiology as well. This is important especially given that historically 
neurobiological animal experimentation has been developed in biology departments and 
medical schools more often than in psychology departments (Haug and Whalen 1999).
3.1. Animal Models as Experimental Tools
Experimental neurobiology is a biological discipline and thus its philosophical account 
should be situated within philosophy of biology, and more precisely on the intersection of 
philosophy of biology and philosophy of psychology. In their experimental practices, the 
biological sciences make an extensive use of material models that include animal organ-
isms or their parts. The most widely utilized tools for biomedical and neurobiological ex-
perimentation are animal models. Animal models are systems of material objects contain-
ing live modified or intact non-human animals or their parts. They are used for (very often) 
invasive experimentation that relies on inducing or simulating pathological physiological 
conditions in the experimental subjects. The ultimate goal of this kind of experimentation 
is to learn about the occurrence, development, and treatment of the conditions of interest, 
where the interventions used to produce the studied effects (for the most part) would not 
be morally permissible on human subjects. The animals in such models are typically used 
as proxies or substitutes for humans. Animal models in neurobiological experimentation 
share many common features with biomedical animal models and other related material bi-
ological models such as model and experimental organisms (Ankeny and Leonelli 2011) all 
of which contain animal organisms or their tissues or organs as their integral parts. Unlike 
other types of models used in science, models containing animals as substitutes for humans 
are supposed to be similar to the phenomena they target to represent. This is so because the 
extrapolation of knowledge about laboratory animals to naturally occurring human proc-
esses and conditions relies on analogical arguments and analogical arguments require es-
tablishing relevant similarities and/or identities between the two analogues which are com-
pared.
Hesse (1966/1963) grounds this sort of inference on the basis of material analogy. She 
describes it as comparison between two analogues defined in terms of their properties and 
the relationships between them. An analogy includes horizontal and vertical relationships 
between those properties. The horizontal relationships are the relationships of similarity 
and dissimilarity between the properties of the two analogues. The vertical relationships 
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are the causal relationships that hold between the properties of each analogue. The infer-
ence based on analogy proceeds as follows: if two objects can be shown to share identical or 
very similar sets of horizontal properties, then whatever is known to be a causal relationship 
between those properties of one of the objects can be assumed to be present in the other 
object as well. For example, humans and rats share similarities of their nervous systems in 
terms of corresponding brain structures, neurotransmitters, etc. They also share similari-
ties in their behaviors. For example, both humans and rats are capable of learning to locate 
the position of an object of interest provided that it remains in the same location during 
multiple training situations. Because we know that the removal of the hippocampus in hu-
mans leads to inability to form long-term declarative memories we can infer by analogy that 
similar deficits will occur in rats provided that their hippocampus is removed. Analogies 
are used when one of the analogues is familiar and its internal properties and their causal 
relationships are well known. This analogue is then used as a model on the basis of which 
knowledge about some unknown features of the other analogue can be inferred. Animal 
models thus serve as such models for human conditions.
The arguments that justify extrapolation of knowledge about laboratory animals to hu-
mans in the natural world depend on this sort of material analogy. All biological models 
that include live organisms or their tissues fall under the category of material models. Ma-
terial models are central to theoretical and experimental biology (Laubichler and Müller 
2007, Leonelli 2007). All models that include animals as their parts rely on the assumption 
that there are relevant similarities and commonalities between all animal species, or at least 
between the species involved in any given comparative study. Thus, by analogy, what is 
known about one species can be extended as knowledge about the relevantly similar other 
species. The argument for using certain species for drawing conclusions about the biologi-
cal makeup of others is thus an argument from analogy. One of its premises asserts the rele-
vant similarities between the two species (horizontal relation of similarity). This is taken to 
justify the assumption that if something is experimentally learned about a given species (i.e. 
some vertical causal relation is established in the model) then it probably applies to other 
species of interest (i.e. the same causal relationship holds between the corresponding prop-
erties of the analogue). Another premise asserts that something is known about the experi-
mental animals. The conclusion of the argument asserts that what is known about the ex-
perimental animals applies to the targeted animals as well.
In the case of mood or neurological disorders, the relevant similarities between the 
model and its target are observable behaviors and corresponding physiological states. When 
animals are used to study depression and schizophrenia, for example, their behaviors are 
taken to correspond to the analogous human behaviors associated with the studied condi-
tions. In order to be able to extrapolate knowledge from the animal models of these condi-
tions, neurobiologists have to first show that what is known about the human conditions, 
or at least something very similar to them, can be reproduced or simulated in animal organ-
isms. This is the process of model building in which an animal model is designed and devel-
oped so that it can simulate the studied condition, e.g. depression (Willner 1991a).
In the process of designing an animal model of a given condition, the human condi-
tion is initially a model for its animal model in a sense very similar to that articulated by 
Hesse. At this stage the available knowledge about the human condition is greater than 
the knowledge available about the animal model. Only after the human condition has 
been successfully modeled, or simulated, in the animal model can it be used as an instru-
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ment to generate further knowledge that can then be extrapolated back to humans. The 
philosophical discussions about the validity of extrapolation of knowledge about animal 
models to human conditions have largely focused on this second stage. However, what 
makes the extrapolation legitimate actually happens at the first stage, the stage of model 
building.
3.2. Calibration of Animal Models
The stage of model building is characterized by considerations for getting the model to 
match its target in relevant respects. It is very well captured by the notion of calibration of 
laboratory models to features of their targets used in Skipper (2004). Skipper employs this 
notion of calibration to capture the justification of the extrapolation of results obtained in 
laboratory models of populations of organisms to evolutionary processes occurring in natu-
ral populations. He shows that extrapolation is justified when laboratory models —popula-
tions of organisms in the case he studies— “are matched, or tuned, or calibrated, to relevant 
features of natural populations” (2004, 372). Similarly, animal models are tuned to exhibit 
features and behaviors similar to the ones characteristic of humans in the studied condi-
tions.
Skipper (2004) develops his notion of calibration of biological laboratory models as an 
extension to the notion of calibration articulated in Franklin (1997). Franklin (1997) de-
fines calibration as “the use of surrogate signal to standardize an instrument”, which “is an 
important strategy for the establishment of the validity of experimental results” (Franklin 
1997, 31). He further distinguishes calibration from measurement. While in measurement 
the results of an experiment are unknown, in calibration, the expected results are known in 
advance. Calibration aims at getting an instrument to reproduce known effects. Franklin 
also introduces an extended version of the calibration strategy, which includes estimating 
the validity of an experimental result by examining the analysis procedures employed in its 
formulation (Franklin 1997, 75). The analysis of some typical examples of establishing va-
lidity of animal models articulated in the next section shows that the notion of calibration 
can be extended to capture the experimental practices employed for the validation of ani-
mal models in neurobiology.
4. Establishing Validity
The types of validity of animal models explicitly addressed by neurobiologists typically in-
clude predictive validity, face validity, construct validity, and criterion validity (Vorhees 
1987, Willner 1991b, Sufka et al. 2009, Warnick et al. 2009, Hymel et al. 2010). Predic-
tive validity is often assessed by the responses of animal models to drugs whose effects are 
known. For example if a model of anxiety exhibits lack of anxious behavior when treated 
with anxyolitics (drugs known to be effective in the treatment of human anxiety), then it is 
considered to have predictive validity. If it also responds in the expected way to chemicals 
that are known to worsen the condition the model has even better predictive validity. Pre-
dictive validity, according to Vorhees, is “the ability of a test to predict effects from an in-
complete or partial data set” (Vorhees 1987, 458). In the case of preclinical toxicology tests, 
it is important to show that an animal test will be predictive for the effects that a given 
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chemical would produce in humans. It is crucial to establish a test’s “cross-species predic-
tive validity”. The strategy here is to test animals’ reactions to substances that are known to 
be toxic for humans but it is also important for the model to be capable of correctly iden-
tifying substances that are non-toxic for humans. When an animal model exhibits effects 
similar to those known to occur in humans in reaction to multiple substances, it can be ex-
pected to be successful in predicting the effects of other substances on humans based on the 
animal reactions produced in the experimental system.
Face validity “refers to a phenomenological similarity between the model and the disor-
der it simulates: on one hand, the model should resemble the disorder, while on the other, 
there should be no major dissimilarities” (Willner 1991b, 9). It is usually established by in-
ducing in the test organism behaviors that resemble the target behaviors superficially. The 
requirement is to make the model look like the target phenomenon “on the face of it” re-
gardless of the underlying mechanisms that are causally responsible for what is observed.
Evaluating the theoretical rationale behind a given animal model is what is involved 
in estimating its construct validity. Construct validity is based not only on comparison of 
behaviors or superficial similarities. It also requires proper mapping between the hypothe-
sized mechanisms underlying the human and the animal behaviors respectively. As Sullivan 
herself properly identifies this sort of validity, it requires establishing the identity of the hy-
pothesized causally responsible constructs and whatever the experiment actually measures.
Criterion validity refers to the “ability of a test to measure a characteristic that can be 
independently defined” (Vorhees 1987, 457). Vorhees points out that this approach to 
establishing validity in toxicology can be successful if a database with known neurotoxic 
agents is made available. A test is then estimated for its efficacy when applied to known 
neurotoxins.
All of the conceptualizations of validity that can be identified as operative in experimental 
neurobiology require the analysis of the results of multiple tests and experiments. If this analy-
sis shows that the results converge or at least are compatible with one another and they prop-
erly exhibit the target effects, the tested animal models are considered valid representations, or 
simulations, of the studied phenomena. As such the notion of convergence typically underlies 
all of the notions of validity operant in neurobiological animal model experimentation.
4.1. Convergent Validity
Campbell and Fiske (1959) discuss a validation procedure which requires the convergence 
of measurements from independent tests and techniques. They note that this requirement 
underlies most notions of validity in experimental psychology. Because all experimental 
procedures are potentially fallible, a multiplicity of independent experimental techniques 
which converge in the results they produce will ensure the validity of the knowledge gener-
ated this way. Campbell and Fiske term this type of validity convergent validity. It captures 
well the commonalities shared by the different types of validity with which neurobiologists 
operate.
In neurobiology, testing for convergence may take different forms. It may involve testing 
the model for reproduction of target effects using different factors whose effects are known 
in the target system. For example, an animal model developed for drug testing is first tested 
against multiple known substances whose effects are well documented in humans in order 
to check whether the animal responds in similar ways to the known treatments. It may in-
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volve using multiple different tests to check whether the model captures multiple aspects of 
the target phenomenon as well as to check the tests against each other in order to avoid con-
flation of artifacts of the experimental setup with genuine targeted effects. In the following 
subsections, I provide examples of how these validation goals are actually implemented.
4.2. Testing for Convergence against Multiple Known Factors
In their experiment performed with the goal to establish the validity of the fowl chick 
model as a simulation of the anxiety-depression continuum, Warnick et al. (2009) tested 
their model for reproducing the target phenomenon. The model is designed to mimic the 
anxiety-depression continuum symptoms by inducing —through social separation— be-
havior which is taken to correspond to the human behavior characteristic of the syndrome. 
In this experiment, Warnick and colleagues aimed to strengthen the validity of the anxiety-
depression continuum chick model. According to the experimental paradigm they had pre-
viously developed, socially raised chicks exhibit panic-like anxiety induced by social separa-
tion for the first 5 min of a 2-hour-long test. The chicks’ anxiety is measured on the basis of 
the rate of their distress vocalizations which drop in half within 20-25 minutes after the be-
ginning of the test and remain relatively steady for the remainder of the 2-hour-period. The 
latter phase of the test is taken to mimic the human state of depression conceived as learned 
helplessness (Warnick et al. 2009, 144).
For their new experiment, they used 5 to 7-day old socially raised Gallus gallus cock-
erels. Different groups of the animals were treated with 2 chemically different medically 
approved anxiolytics and 3 different known antidepressants. The animals were subjected 
to the behavioral paradigm described earlier. For each drug, Warnick and colleagues com-
pared the effects of multiple concentrations with the effects of treatment with an inactive 
substance in socially isolated animals and animals put in cages with two conspecifics. As ex-
pected, the social animals did not exhibit significant distress symptoms whereas the isolated 
animals exhibited high rates of distress vocalization in the phase of anxiety and the typical 
drop in half of the rate of distress vocalizations during the depression-like stage. All of the 
tested drugs, except one of the antidepressants led to reduced rates of distress vocalizations 
during the anxiety phase indicating the expected anxiolytic effect. The only antidepressant 
that did not induce such effect was interpreted as a true negative because it had been previ-
ously shown to be ineffective in the treatment of situationally bound panic disorder (2009, 
153). As expected, in the depression-like phase, all tested antidepressants led to increased 
rate of distress vocalizations. This was taken to indicate antidepressant action. These re-
sults, combined with further analysis of depression-biomarkers in the blood of tested ani-
mals and the results of previous animal and clinical studies, were taken to strengthen the 
validity of the “chick anxiety-depression continuum as a clinical simulation and putative 
preclinical screening assay” (2009, 153).
The establishment of the validity of the chick model relied on the convergent results 
from multiple drug tests which reproduced —in animals— effects that were known to 
occur in humans. Warnick and colleagues argued that because the validity of the animal 
model simulation was established in this experiment, the same behavioral paradigm could 
be used for testing other treatments as well. In other words, it could be used as an experi-
mental tool that would produce valid results. The knowledge generated this way could then 
be extrapolated to humans.
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4.3. Convergent and Compatible Results from Different Tests
Another way to guarantee the validity of a model of a given process is to embed tests within 
more complex experimental arrangements. Such is the purpose of using test batteries. Test 
batteries are sets of multiple experimental tests that are commonly employed in the study 
of the complex functions, or dysfunctions, of the nervous system. Vorhees (1996) defines 
a test battery for assessing central nervous system (CNS) function as “a collection of tests, 
assembled to provide a systematic assessment of the neurological, cognitive, or emotional 
status of the animal [laboratory rodents in the case analyzed by Vorhees]” (227). The tests 
employed in different batteries vary according to the different experimental goals of the 
studies that employ them. Vorhees discusses toxicological test batteries and distinguishes 
between broad spectrum, focused, and mixed test batteries. Broad spectrum test batter-
ies can be comprehensive, “designed to provide broad profile of all major functional do-
mains” or screening, “intended to detect only major neurobehavioral deficits” (228). Broad 
spectrum test batteries include multiple tests among which locomotor activity, auditory 
startle habituation, operant conditioning, etc. They are often used to assess the spectrum 
of the effects on multiple CNS functions produced by compounds with unknown neuro-
toxicity. Focused test batteries are employed in experiments that explore a particular hy-
pothesis. Vorhees points out that among “the most common types of focused batteries are 
those investigating the effects of particular drugs or surgical treatments on different types 
of learning” (id.). Mixed test batteries share characteristics with the other two types. Like 
the broad spectrum test batteries, they are used in multi-functional analysis of unknown 
effects. However, they are employed when there are strong reasons to believe that a given 
treatment or other causal agent has a particular effect on the functions of the central nerv-
ous system. In this sense, mixed batteries are more similar to the focused test batteries be-
cause there is a particular hypothesis about a causal action that is tested in the experiment. 
Vorhees summarizes the main reasons that motivate the design and use of test batteries as 
follows,
…multiple tests provide a comprehensive assessment of different CNS functional domains. Mul-
tiple dependent measures provide converging data on each functional domain by measuring the 
underlying variable with different degrees of overlap and also different degrees of error. Differ-
ent ways of measuring the same variable provide different types of measurement error, the sum of 
which may be expected to cancel each other out, leaving the best possible assessment of the cen-
tral process of interest. For example, learning cannot be measured directly and must rely upon 
sensory and motor capacities, but differences in vision, hearing, motivation, motoric ability, and 
other factors can affect performance on tests of learning. By measuring different performance fac-
tors, one can generally be assured that treatment-related differences between groups are attribut-
able to differences in learning rather than other factors (1996, 229).
Vorhees provides an argument for the epistemic utility of constructing test batteries with 
at least partial functional overlap. When one and the same function is assessed with multi-
ple tests this “overlap provides convergence of evidence thereby assuring that if an effect is 
found on, for example, memory, the effect is real, reliable, and not an artifact of perform-
ance factors” (Vorhees 1996, 230).
As in the previous example, test batteries rely on some sort of converging of results pro-
duced on the basis of multiple tests or different experimental arrangements. What is im-
Theoria 30/2 (2015): 163-181
 Validating Animal Models 175
portant is that producing compatible and converging results on the basis of multiple tests 
or experimental arrangements strengthens the validity of each line of converging results. 
These results validate one another.
Both examples of establishing convergent validity can be considered as applications 
of the calibration strategy in a broad sense. The validation of the chick anxiety-depression 
continuum model uses calibration as testing against multiple known factors to confirm 
that their known effects are reproduced in the animal model. The strategy Warnick et al. 
used is presenting a surrogate signal to check whether the model reproduces the expected 
results. The chemicals applied in the testing of the model were used as surrogates for the 
novel compounds which would eventually be tested in the model if it was established as 
a device that would detect their effects. Test batteries exemplify calibration that employs 
testing different experimental setups against each other to check whether they produce 
converging and/or compatible results. The results of the individual tests within a battery 
are tested against each other to ensure that the apparatus detects the phenomena it is sup-
posed to detect. This sort of analysis is in line with the extended version of calibration as a 
strategy for justifying the validity of experimental results. It also makes explicit the need for 
multiple experimental designs, protocols, and procedures which produce convergent (or at 
least compatible) results in order to establish the validity of the knowledge claims produced 
on the basis of animal experimentation. Contrary to Sullivan’s view, animal models get val-
idated not in spite of but by virtue of multiple different experimental protocols. Neurobiol-
ogists claim their animal models to be valid when the results they produce are compatible, 
consistent, and/or convergent with the results produced in different experimental setups 
and/or in variations of the same experimental setup. So far, I have addressed Sullivan’s con-
cern about the lack of standard and unified experimental procedures in neurobiology. In 
the next section, I address her concern about the opposing prescriptions that validity and 
reliability impose on experimental design.
5. Establishing Reliability
Calibration is also employed for establishing the reliability of animal models in neurobi-
ology when identical or slightly modified animal model designs are tested for reproduc-
ibility of effects and convergence of results in different laboratories. The reliability estab-
lished this way is broader than the notion of reliability Sullivan opposes to validity. On 
her account, neurobiologists aim at strengthening the reliability of the procedures they use 
within their laboratory. That is to say, they focus on strengthening the intra-laboratory re-
liability of their experimental systems. However, neurobiologists are sometimes interested 
in establishing the inter-laboratory reliability of their models. This interest is justified given 
that good science requires experimental results to be capable of being replicated in a variety 
of circumstances, including other laboratories. The following subsection provides an exam-
ple of how neurobiologists establish both types of reliability.
5.1. Testing for Reproducibility in Different Laboratories
Vorhees (1987) discusses the implications of a collaborative study in which the results 
from two experiments involving identical behavioral tests (employing identical appara-
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tuses, strains of animals, and protocols) performed in six different American laboratories 
were compared. The first experiment traced the effects of prenatal exposure to ampheta-
mine and the second studied the effects of prenatal exposure to methylmercury. There was 
a “high degree of comparability between all laboratories for a given study” and a “remark-
able degree of comparability within laboratories” from the first to the second experiment 
(V orhees 1987, 450). In other words, the study showed that the tested battery had both 
inter- and intra-laboratory reliability. It did so even though there were differences in the 
baseline results between laboratories. Despite those differences, the detection power of the 
tests was similar across different laboratories. This meant that the tested model’s behavior 
was reproduced reliably. These results were compared to the results of a German labora-
tory whose study used identical apparatus for activity testing but modified protocols. The 
results were also comparable and because an “excellent degree of between laboratory com-
parability was obtained”, Vorhees concluded that this “refutes the notion that almost any 
procedural variation has major effects on measures of behavior” (451).
The study demonstrated that in order for reliability to be established, laboratories have 
to keep a record of a baseline of controls which can be compared with a contemporaneous 
control group for establishing a baseline for any experiment. This would provide means for 
estimating intra-laboratory reliability. Establishing a baseline is also crucial for the compa-
rability of test results between laboratories. This is necessary for estimating inter-laboratory 
reliability. Establishing a baseline for the results of behavioral tests and comparing baseline 
to group differences between laboratories takes the form of calibrating animal models. The 
results of different laboratories are tested for convergence against each other. The expected 
effect is that all laboratories would produce converging results. Once the convergence of 
results is established, the procedures employed in these studies can be used as a standard 
against which future experimental designs can be calibrated.
5.2. Strengthening Reliability while Strengthening Validity
It is now evident that the same sort of strategy is used for establishing both the reliability 
and the validity of animal models in neurobiology. This practice is well captured by the no-
tion of robustness analysis articulated by Wimsatt (1981). Robustness analysis, according 
to Wimsatt, is, among other things, the “use of multiple means of determination” with the 
goal to confirm the validity, or reality, of a given postulated theoretical construct, the relia-
bility of a test or instrument, as well as for calibration or recalibration of measuring devices 
(Wimsatt 1981, 63). However, robustness analysis is a much broader family of techniques 
and strategies than the calibration strategy discussed in the previous sections. Philosophers 
of neuroscience have tended to focus on its usefulness in determining the reality of unob-
servable entities and/or their properties (e.g. Craver 2007, Eronen 2012).
My purpose here is to articulate the practice for ensuring reliability of experimental 
tools and the validity of the knowledge claims generated with their help. This is why I need 
to restrain my analysis to a narrower domain of application. Campbell and Fiske’s account 
is already among Wimsatt’s inspirations and it is focused on the relationship between relia-
bility and validity. This motivates my choice not to employ robustness analysis even though 
it is an already established notion in philosophy of neuroscience.
Campbell and Fiske’s focused analysis articulates quite clearly the commonalities and 
differences between validity and reliability. In their account, “Validation is typically conver-
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gent, a confirmation by independent measurement procedures” (Campbell and Fiske 1959, 
81). Thus, it requires multiple tests and procedures in order to be established. Similarly, re-
liability also requires reproducibility over multiple tests and repetition of procedures. How-
ever, while reliability requires reproducibility, or convergence, of results produced with 
identical tests, validity requires reproducibility, or convergence, of results produced with 
different tests and/or different causal factors. As Campbell and Fiske put it,
Both reliability and validity concepts require that agreement between measures be demon-
strated. A common denominator which most validity concepts share in contradistinction to re-
liability is that this agreement represents the convergence of independent approaches. […] Inde-
pendence is, of course, a matter of degree and, in this sense, reliability and validity can be seen as 
regions on a continuum. […] Reliability is the agreement between two efforts to measure the same 
trait through maximally similar methods. Validity is represented in the agreement between two 
attempts to measure the same trait through maximally different methods (1959, 83).
Convergent validity is achieved when measurements produced using different techniques 
converge. Even though Campbell and Fiske represent reliability and validity as located 
on different ends of a spectrum, this does not necessarily put them in opposition, as does 
S ullivan’s account. An animal model can be calibrated to reproduce reliably the targeted ef-
fects. It may produce results which converge towards the results produced using modified 
protocols and procedures (as in the case described by Vorhees 1987) or towards the results 
of independent tests and techniques (as in the case of test batteries). The calibration strat-
egy can be used in both cases. Campbell and Fiske’s notion of validity as requiring the con-
vergence of multiple tests, thus allows for the same procedures that strengthen reliability to 
strengthen validity of the neurobiological knowledge produced on the basis of animal ex-
perimentation. This means that using the calibration strategy, it is possible to strengthen 
both reliability and validity at the same time. This also shows that focusing on strengthen-
ing the reliability of simple laboratory models is consistent with establishing the validity of 
their results provided that multiple laboratory models produce results that converge.
One might object that this procedure does not account for the tension between the 
opposing prescriptions of validity and reliability. In Sullivan’s account, validity prescribes 
complexity and reliability prescribes simplification of experimental designs. The calibration 
strategy seems to favor simplicity because simpler designs will more readily reproduce the 
expected results.
My response is that this opposition results from two inaccurate beliefs that Sullivan 
holds, namely: (1) that animals in the wild are more similar to humans than laboratory 
animals and (2) that validity of neurobiological knowledge claims requires them to be the 
product of laboratory systems including organisms and their environments that match the 
complexity of the target natural world systems including organisms and their natural en-
vironments. The combination of (1) and (2) leads Sullivan to the conclusion that validity 
requires the laboratory systems to be so designed as to have the environments of the tested 
organisms to match the complexity of the environments that these organisms are likely to 
encounter in the wild. Both of these assumptions are unjustified.
1. The first is unjustified because many neurobiological animal models are such that 
they are not meant to be representative of the species from which the organisms 
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used in experiments are drawn. Rather, they are meant to represent human condi-
tions directly. In this sense, laboratory animals may be more similar (at least in the 
relevant respects) to humans than they are to their counterparts in the wild. This 
point is well exemplified in the case study developed by Ankeny et al. (2014). An-
keny and colleagues study animal model research on alcohol addiction in North 
America since the mid-twentieth century. Their analysis shows that in the kind of 
experiments employed in the field, it is crucial to situate the experimental animals 
in environments that are representative of the environments in which the human 
targets of the models are typically situated. The goal is to get the animals to exhibit 
behaviors similar to the behaviors of humans in those environments (Ankeny et al. 
2014, 488). Note that those environments and behaviors do not have to be typical 
of the animals in their natural environments. This is so because “interest in human 
alcoholism is what drives research interests, not scientific interest in understanding 
alcohol’s effects on non-human animals for its own sake” (494). In this sense, the 
experimental animals employed in the neurobiological study of human conditions 
are more similar to humans than their counterparts in the world outside the labo-
ratory. Therefore, Sullivan’s concern that laboratory animals are raised and tested 
in conditions quite different than their natural environments does not affect the 
validity of extrapolation of laboratory knowledge produced through animal experi-
mentation to knowledge about human conditions in the world outside the labora-
tory.
2. The second assumption is unjustified because Sullivan takes the complexity of nat-
ural environments to be the crucial characteristic that has to be present in labora-
tory environments in order to ensure the match between laboratory environments 
and the environments in which the target conditions occur naturally. However, in 
order to secure reproducible knowledge, laboratories have to operate with highly 
controlled environments. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the relevant fac-
tors from the target environments cannot be reproduced in a controlled environ-
ment. As Ankeny and colleagues point out, while in areas of biomedical research 
such as genetic studies, the environment is taken as a background against which 
the organism is studied in isolation, in behavioral studies (in their case alcohol re-
search), “model validity is assessed with reference to the features of both the organ-
ism itself and the environment and experimental settings within which it is being 
studied” (2014, 487). This is to show that neurobiologists do take the role of envi-
ronment to be a relevant factor in their models. However, nothing in this realiza-
tion implies that the relevant feature of the natural environment to be matched in 
the laboratory is its complexity. The examples discussed in the previous sections 
show how the validity of the knowledge claims obtained in controlled settings can 
be established on the basis of the match, or convergence, of multiple relatively sim-
ple experimental setups. I take this to be indicative of the adequacy of the notion 
of convergent validity in capturing the practices of validation of animal models in 
experimental neurobiology.
When validity of neurobiological animal models is conceptualized as convergent validity, 
this allows the application of the calibration strategy for the purpose of strengthening both 
reliability and validity. Thus, the inherent contradiction between the prescriptions im-
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posed on experimental design by reliability and validity identified by Sullivan (2007, 2009) 
dissolves. In effect, maintaining a multiplicity of simple experimental designs and protocols 
is in fact justified and shows that experimental neurobiology is not in a state of crisis and it 
is actually thriving.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I aimed at providing an account of contemporary neurobiology that would 
make sense of the experimental practices and the methodological decisions prevalent in 
the field. Because experimental neurobiology relies almost exclusively on the use of animal 
models to study the human nervous system, I analyzed their building and justification as 
valid representations of human conditions. I argued that the validation of animal models 
in neurobiology often proceeds through their calibration in order to reproduce the targeted 
effects. This calibration takes the form of testing of animal models against factors whose ef-
fects in humans are well known, e.g. the effects of medically approved drugs. It often takes 
the form of employing multiple tests whose results are checked against each other for con-
vergence and/or consistency, e.g. in test batteries. Calibration is also used for establishing 
reliability in neurobiological experiments. Because, it is the same strategy that is used to es-
tablish both validity and reliability, I argued that the tension which Sullivan identifies be-
tween validity and reliability as norms of neurobiological experimental design ultimately 
dissolves. In other words, maintaining a multiplicity of experimental protocols for the study 
of identical natural world phenomena is methodologically well justified. Furthermore, the 
tendency of different laboratories to strengthen the reliability of their idiosyncratic proto-
cols does not preclude the validity of the knowledge produced in one laboratory as knowl-
edge about the effects studied in other laboratories and ultimately about the phenomena in 
the world outside the laboratory. This is so because when multiple different experimental 
designs and protocols produce converging results they increase each other’s validity.
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